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Abstract: Interconnectivity between web systems and sensor networks is useful to provide 
smart services for the Internet of Things. These services are based on data collection and 
processing to obtain useful information about the supervised environment. Using this 
information it is possible to provide smart services, but some of them must be considered 
as protected by the legislation regarding privacy of personal data. In order to face this 
issue, security and privacy mechanisms must be used. So as to deal with the limited 
resources in sensor networks, these mechanisms must be as lightweight as possible to 
preserve the enough Quality of Service. However, these mechanisms must fulfill security 
and privacy requirements defined by the regulations. This paper describes a Wireless Body 
Area Network application providing services to protect firefighters work in hazardous 
environments. The firefighter wears a special shirt with sensors embedded. These sensors 
are able to monitor not only the firefighter health status, but also they can be connected to 
external sensors in order to monitor the health status of the victims. These external sensors 
are part of the equipment carried by the firefighter to face the emergencies and save lives. 
Finally, using this solution they are able to obtain external medical aid. 
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1. Introduction 
In this paper we propose a service to protect firefighters and victims by means of a Wireless Body 
Area Network (WBAN) used by the fire brigades in hazardous environments. It is based on a special 
shirt with sensors embedded that are able to monitor the firefighter health status. In addition, these 
wearable sensors can be connected to external sensors in order to monitor the health status of the 
victims. The external sensors are part of the equipment carried by the firefighter in order to obtain 
external medical aid so as to provide a safe rescue procedure to victims. The basic structure of the 
service is depicted in Figure 1 where the key elements are included. There are two different actuations 
roles. The first one is the “rescue team”, where each firefighter carries a wearable sensor to gather the 
vital health parameters [1] and act as a cluster head for the sensors placed on the victims found. The 
cluster heads are able to assist each other, and all cluster heads can find the best route to the gateway, 
either directly or via cluster heads neighborhood. Thus, the health status of all the persons involved in 
the rescue (firefighters and victims) is controlled by medical staff, giving the appropriate directions 
oriented to save their lives. The second role is the “support team”, which receives and identifies the 
victims, and carries them to a safe place. 
 
Figure 1. Firefighters team, in emergency actuation carrying wireless body sensors. 
2. Analysis of the Requirements Regarding Security Privacy and Trust on Data Gathered 
As presented in the 2014 conference paper titled “Automatic System for Providing Security 
Services in the Internet of Things applications over Wireless Sensor Networks” [2], the security and 
privacy protections are regulated by laws [3]. In the case of Spanish and European regulations the 
trend is to construct a DPIA-T (Data Protection Impact Assessment – Template) [4] for each service. 
Previously, it is necessary to know some high level information about the service called Utility Matrix 
in [2], which is divided in two groups as we can see in Table 1 where both the service and the network 
type that supports the services are defined. The security and privacy imperatives in DPIA-T format [4] 
are as follows: 1- Data related health status is considered as personal data that must be protected. 2- 
Data must be as fresh as possible and true. 3- Critical data for safety the life are priority. 
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Table 1. Utility Matrix: Service and Network type for the service. 
UTILITY MATRIX: Description Network Type 
Service name Firefighter and victims protecting Network name NW_Type1 
Service Type Health-care; Safety Mote resources limit Wearable mote: Memory to store data on 
standalone operation 
Environment Type Emergency Connectivity Radio 
Country Spain Communications  
Promoter Government BS resources limit None 
User Firefighter Topology Mesh for Cluster heads, Star between 
victims motes and the cluster head 
Monitored person Firefighter and victims. Nodes Roles Gather health and environment parameters 
Legal capacity of person Variety of cases Routing Hieratical based on cluster heads 
Special needs person Variety of cases  
Continuity of service Yes; (standalone operation) 
Critically of the service  high 
 
The legal imperatives over sensitive information are structured as shown in Table 2, and the specific 
protections to data set are assigned in the Table 3.  
Table 2. Legal imperatives in DPIA-T format. 
DPIA-T : Firefighter and victims protecting solution. 
Security service Attack Target Defence 
Availability DoS 
1- The physical layer is degraded and the communication among 
nodes is impossible (jamming). 2- A spurious node starts sending 
malicious data packets to the network. 
It must be known the situation 
for to face it. 
Authentication 
Sybil A node is asking for multiple IDs, and if the attack succeeds, the node is able to subvert the trust mechanism. 
Restore trust mechanism 
rejecting the malicious node. 
Node 
replication 
When a node ID is copied, replicated in a new node, and then 
introduced in the network. From that moment on, the network 
accepts the node with the cloned ID as an authorized node. 
Realize and revoke the malicious 
node. 
False node 
It introduces data traffic in the network to avoid legitimate nodes 
to communicate (injecting false data messages, claiming for 
authorization continuously, etc.). 
Identify the false node and 
discard all messages. 
Integrity Message corruption 
When a message reaches the recipient with a different content than 
the one sent by the source. This situation is either because the 
message has been degraded in the transmission, or because the 
message has been intercepted and intentionally changed. 
Ensure that messages have not 
been altered. 
Privacy 
Eavesdropping Other devices listening in the same frequency may intercept every communication between two nodes. 
Provide authentication and 
ciphering capabilities. Use data 
anonymization. 
Node 
subversion 
When a node is captured and cryptoanalyzed the secret keys, node 
ID, security policies, and so forth are disclosed. 
Use few data stored in each node 
and renew the keys. 
Table 3. Data protection over data sets and trust domains defined. 
Sensor Measures Type Auth Integr Privacy Avail Intruders insiders 
Trust 
domain 
1 
Firefighters 
CO; Smoke; Gas Vital for life X X - X X 
Domain 1 
2 Temperature heart rate 
Private 
information 
X X - X X 
3 Victims 
Temperature 
heart rate 
Oxygen saturation 
X X - X X 
4 
Firefighters 
Victim 
Support 
Temperature 
heart rate 
Oxygen saturation 
personal identification 
X X X - X Domain 2 
Regarding security services and mechanisms designed for this type of service and network, the 
expert system module TSES knowledge base [2] was already defined (among many others) and the 
SensoTrust proposal security structure [5] has been chosen, which is based on trust domains definition 
where each of them has a common security policy [6,7]. Two trust domains have been defined: one for 
the rescue team (Domain 1) and the other for the firefighter support team (Domain 2), selecting the 
Domain Key Servers (as presented in SensoTrust proposal [5] in both domains using the cluster head 
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nodes. Once the protections to data regarding the service have been assigned, the expert system [2] 
must find the appropriate mechanisms in its knowledge base to face the attacks mentioned in DPIA-T. 
As already presented in Table 3, there are two major types of security and privacy requirements. After 
applying the legal imperatives (DPIA-T) to the current case, the following list of security and privacy 
mechanisms appears, taking into account that it can be applied as the common scheme indicated (key 
distributed, roles and trust policies) in SensoTrust [5]. Trust domain policies are shown in Table 4. 
Countermeasures against outsider attacks are based on authentication, and the countermeasures against 
insider attacks are based on the security policies and the trust domains. 
Table 4. Trust domain policies. 
 Domain 1 policy Domain 2 policy 
Security 
service Attack Countermeasure - 
Avail. DoS One alarm is triggered in the Security Manager informing about the situation - 
Authent. 
Sybil In The security scheme, every node ID is preconfigured for each node and only the Security Manager (out of the WSN) has the complete list of the IDs. In extremis, it is possible to perform a node revocation. 
Node 
replication 
The Node ID is stored in an external entity (SM) that controls all the IDs working in the network.  
Security policy, if the SM detects that 2 nodes are operating with the same ID, a node revocation protocol is 
issued, and the node is dropped from the network. 
False node Using the node ID, the schema is able to identify the false node and, using the domain key renewal functionality, all the messages sent by this node will be discarded. 
Integ. Message corruption 
To avoid both issues, security schema includes the ciphering suite functionality, which allows performing a 
message hash (using MD5, SHA1, etc.). 
Priv. 
Eavesdropping - 
To avoid data disclosure, It provides both symmetric and PKI 
ciphering capabilities. Anonymization, unlink the personal 
identification and his/her measure data 
Node 
subversion - 
To avoid it is to minimize the cryptographic and security 
information stored in each node. Nevertheless, all the keys in 
the network can be renewed. 
3. Results and Discussion 
To preserve the Quality of Service (QoS) it is necessary to know the restrictions. Sensors 1-3 
(firefighter and victims) have as critical requirements both battery consumption and delay, but this 
does not applies to sensor 4 (Firefighters victim Support). The results obtained in laboratory tests are 
presented in Figure 2. Finally, it is necessary that the system provides reports about both the anomalies 
found (attack detections as a result of true positives, true negatives, false positives and false negatives) 
and their reactions. The reporting to BES and TSES is composed by: 1- no legislation-based impact 
attacks; 2- seriousness of the impacts; 3- legislation-based impact and 4- alarm report. 
Reporting to LES is composed by legislation-based impact and improvement plan report. Some 
indicators [8] are defined as the Percentile 90 over the time until fault resolution, considering MTBF 
(Mean Time Between Failures) as true positives and false negatives, and MTTR (Mean Time To 
Repair) as true positives, false negatives and false positives (as the resources spent on inefficient 
results). The actuations on false negatives represent the impact when a problem is not detected on time.  
Then, Coef(no attacks) => MTBF / (MTBF + MTTR). 
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Figure 2. Energy spent vs. security services, and d delay vs. security services. 
4. Conclusions 
In this paper we have proposed a service able to protect firefighters and victims using a Wireless 
Body Area Network ported by the fire brigades in hazardous environments. 
In order to protect the Quality of Service of the system and fulfill the security and privacy 
requirements requested by laws it is necessary to provide a tailored security and privacy solution [2]. 
The security structure and the mechanisms to apply must be as lightweight as possible [6,7]. In the 
presented use case of this solution, the expert system proposed in our last conference paper selected 
SensoTrust proposal [5] as one of the best solutions to build the security and privacy solution. It is also 
necessary to monitor service performance both in the resource consumption and the protection offered.  
So as to provide a continuous service enhancement, it is necessary to implement an adequate 
strategy of supervision over the key performance indicators. This supervision must be established over 
the quality of the equipment involved (hardware, software and communication among them), the 
quality of service (functionality) and the quality of security and protection (security services and 
mechanisms). All of them must be analyzed together in order to obtain the desired results. 
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NO SEC:
62 mA; 
12,60 ms
0,033 mA
INTEGRITY:
4,2 mA; 
0,80 ms
AUTHENTI:
3,1 mA; 
0,69 ms
PRIVACY:
2,5 mA; 0,43 ms
TOTAL:
71,8 mA;
14,52 ms
MAXIMUM RESOURCES AVAILABLE MRA
GAP to Maximum 
Resources GMR:
48,2 mA; 5,48 ms
GMR = MRA – (Rno sec + SUM (Rsec ) = 120 mA – 71,8 mA = 48,2 mA
(i) processor: ARM 920T CPU (180 MHz-32 bit),
(ii) memory: 512 Kb RAM, 4 Mb FLASH
(iii) network: Chipcon 2420 radio with integrated antenna 
(IEEE 802.15.4 at 2.4 GHz),
(iv) Data: USB interface—mini-b connector,
(v) power supply: 3.6 V rechargeable 750 mAh Li-Ion batt.
120 mA, 20 ms
GMR = MRA – (Rno sec + SUM (Rsec ) = 20 ms – 14,52 ms = 5,48 ms
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